Essay Essays (1598 words) - Social Philosophy, Animal Rights

Essay Singer's thesis is that we ought to extend to (non-human) animals the same equality of consideration that we extend to human beings. Here's how I think the main contours of his argument shape up: 1. The only criterion of moral importance that succeeds in including all humans, and excluding all non-humans, is simple membership in the species Homo sapiens. 2. However, using simple membership in the species Homo sapiens as a criterion of moral importance is completely arbitrary. 3. Of the remaining criteria we might consider, only sentiencethe capacity of a being to experience things like pleasure and painis a plausible criterion of moral importance. 4. Using sentience as a criterion of moral importance entails that we extend to other sentient creatures the same basic moral consideration (i.e. "basic principle of equality") that we extend to (typical, sentient) human beings. 5. Therefore, we ought to extend to animals the same equality of consideration that we extend to human beings. Details 1. The only criterion of moral importance that succeeds in including all humans, and excluding all non-humans, is simple membership in the species Homo sapiens. Singer argues for this simply by pointing to variation among humans. If we examine the usual characteristics that people say all humans, and only humans, share, we always find that there are human beings who lack those characteristics: Like it or not, we must face the fact that humans come in different shapes and sizes; they come with differing moral capacities, differing intellectual abilities, differing amounts of benevolent feeling and sensitivity to the needs of others, differing abilities to communicate effectively, and differing capacities to experience pleasure and pain. In short, if the demand for equality were based on the actual equality of all human beings, we would have to stop demanding equality. (173) The only characteristic that every single human being has in common, that no other animal has, is membership in the human species. If you want to say that every human is morally important, and humans are the only creatures that are morally important, your criterion for moral importance must be based simply on species membership. 2. However, using simple membership in the species Homo sapiens as a criterion of moral importance is completely arbitrary. Singer seems to think this is fairly obvious once it is stated. If there is, in fact, no relevant difference between your group and some other group, there is no rational ground for thinking that those who belong to your group deserve greater consideration than those who belong to the other group. Although it is fairly natural for people to use a criterion like this, Singer thinks the obvious parallels with racism are so striking as to invalidate that natural impulse. (This is a typically consequentialist way of thinking; you should consider how deontologists might look at this given the allowance for duties of special relationships in deontological ethics. Should common species membership be considered an appropriate special relationship?) 3. Of the remaining criteria we might consider, only sentiencethe capacity of a being to experience things like pleasure and painis a plausible criterion of moral importance. Singer argues for this in two ways. First, he argues, by example, that the other criteria are bad, because (again) they will exclude people who we think ought not be excluded. For instance, we don't really think that it would be permissible to disregard the well-being of someone who has much lower intelligence than average, so we can't possibly think that intelligence is a suitable criterion for moral consideration. Second, he argues that it is only by virtue of something being sentient that it can be said to have interests at all, so this places sentience in a different category than the other criteria: "The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any meaningful way" (175). That is, Singer is trying to establish that if a being is not sentient, the idea of extending moral consideration to it makes no sense. This negative argument is important, because one common criticism of Singer is that his criterion ends up excluding humans who are no longer sentient (like those in an irreversible coma); Singer is content to accept that consequence,